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Abstract
At the November 2008 height of the Global Financial Crisis, Ireland’s Department of
Finance announced a willingness to inject capital into the six largest banks. This
announcement followed the issuance of a blanket guarantee of those banks’ liabilities in
September 2008. After broadly designing the potential investments in 2008, the Irish
government came to agreements with Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Banks in February
2009 to inject €3.5 billion ($4.5 billion) in each bank in exchange for preferred equity
stakes. The government funded the investments from the funds of the National Pensions
Reserve Fund, something it would secure the authority to do only in March, after the initial
announcements of the recapitalization plan. This set of injections would prove to be only
the first step in a multiyear recapitalization and restructuring process, eventually pushing
the sovereign to a financial rescue from the International Monetary Fund and European
Union.
Keywords Allied Irish Banks, Bank of Ireland, broad-based, broad-based capital injection,
capital injection, Global Financial Crisis, Ireland, National Pensions Reserve Fund
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Ireland 2009 Recapitalization Program
for Financial Institutions
At a Glance
In the wake of the failure of Lehman
Brothers in the fall of 2008, Ireland faced
extreme volatility in its banking system,
with at least three of its six major banks on
the verge of failure (Honohan 2010, 123;
Tooze 2018, 185). Preceding the crisis, the
Irish banking system expanded rapidly;
domestic credit to the nonfinancial private
sector more than doubled to 180% of gross
domestic product between the end of 2002
and September 2008 (Eichengreen 2014,
354). Banks increasingly funded this
expansion with short-term, foreign funding
(BIS 2020, 6). The lending boom reinforced
and was reinforced by a boom in real estate
prices; both expansions would ultimately
prove fragile (BIS 2020, 1–4). As
international financial conditions became
increasingly tumultuous, Ireland moved on
September 30, 2008, to arrest a run on its
financial institutions by guaranteeing the
liabilities of its six largest domestic banks,
€440 billion (then $600 billion) in total
(NYT 2008; Tooze 2018, 185–86). On
October 2, the Irish parliament (the
Oireachtas) passed, and the president
signed, the Credit Institutions (Financial
Support) Act 2008, expanding the minister
for finance’s authorities associated with the
guarantees. This law included a section
granting the minister authority to take
shares of any firm benefiting from such
support (Oireachtas 2008).

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose: To buttress capital levels at Irish banks to
levels to protect their soundness, viability, and
lending capacity—while also meeting international
expectations for bank capital levels (Dept. of Finance
2008c; Dept. of Finance 2008a).
Launch Dates

Announcement: December
14, 2008 (Dept. of Finance
2008d)
Operational: March 30, 2009
(NTMA 2010, 30)

Wind-Down Dates

N/A

Program Size

Not limited

Usage

The 2009 recapitalization of
two private banks via the
National Pensions Reserve
Fund totaled €7 billion ($9
billion) (BIS 2020, 48)

Outcomes

This capital support was the
first of several rounds of
capital injections of various
structures and funding
sources (BIS 2020, 48–49)

Ownership Structure

Owned by the governmentrun public pension system
(NTMA 2010, 29)

Notable Features

Funded by bringing forward
future national pension
contributions (Oireachtas
2009)

While the guarantee was largely successful in stalling the run on Irish banks, officials soon
came to realize that banks’ assets were of dubious quality, and the firms faced shortages of
capital (Honohan 2012, 2–3; Joint Committee 2016, 292; Tooze 2018, 185). Thus, on
November 30, 2008, the Department of Finance announced a willingness to use the
National Pensions Reserve Fund (NPRF) to purchase capital in these institutions (Dept. of
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Finance 2008c). Using the NPRF funds for this purpose required a statutory amendment to
the National Pensions Reserve Act of 2000 (Dept. of Finance 2008d).
On December 14, the government shared its intent to inject capital into three of the
aforementioned six banks: Anglo Irish Bank (Anglo), Bank of Ireland (BoI), and Allied Irish
Banks (AIB) (Dept. of Finance 2008d). However, it announced on January 15, 2009, that it
would instead nationalize Anglo, placing it under government management (Lenihan
2009). The government announced on February 11, 2009, that it would inject €7 billion ($9
billion) into BoI and AIB—€3.5 billion each—in return for noncumulative, preferred shares
(Dept. of Finance 2009; Lenihan 2009). The government was willing to use the NPRF for
the BoI and AIB injections because, unlike in the case of Anglo, it expected to ultimately
receive its funds back from those firms (Joint Committee 2016, 294).
Among other stipulations, the shares gave the government 25% of each bank’s shareholder
voting rights with respect to change of control and board appointments and warrants to
purchase 25% of the banks’ common shares, which came with half of the usual voting
privileges (unless the government sold or otherwise transferred the shares, in which case
100% of the shares’ voting authority was restored). After securing the enabling
amendment and the approvals of shareholders and the European Commission, the
Department effected both injections later in the spring (Dept. of Finance 2009; NTMA 2010,
30).
Summary Evaluation
The 2009 capital injections proved to be only the first step in a multiyear recapitalization
and multifaceted restructuring effort (BIS 2020, 48–49). Although not intended, this
incremental result with respect to the scale of the injections, while perhaps consistent with
European Commission guidance, was to the detriment of the recapitalization as it created
public uncertainty toward the banks’ financial positions and reduced confidence in officials’
management of the problem (EC 2008, 5–6; BIS 2020, 16–17). Eventually, support of
Ireland’s large banks, inclusive of the liability guarantees, shifted the focal point of the
crisis from the banks to the government’s finances, and the financial precariousness of the
banks and the sovereign negatively reinforced each other (Bayoumi 2017, 208;
Eichengreen 2014, 356–57). However, while incrementalism may have hindered the
overall response, any dramatic upsizing of these early interventions likely would have still
come up against the market-based fiscal constraints that the sovereign later faced
(Honohan 2012, 5, 10–11).
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Ireland Context 2008–2009

GDP
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU converted to
USD)
GDP per capita
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU converted to
USD)

Sovereign credit rating (five-year senior
debt)

Size of banking system
Size of banking system as a percentage of
GDP
Size of banking system as a percentage of
financial system

$276.4 billion in 2008
$236.7 billion in 2009
$61,262 in 2008
$52,105 in 2009
As of Q4 2008:
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
Fitch: AAA
As of Q4 2009:
Moody’s: Aa1
S&P: AA
Fitch: AA$469.7 billion in total assets in 2008
$421.0 billion in total assets in 2009.
169.9% in 2008
177.9% in 2009
Data not available

90.7% of total banking assets in 2008
90.8% of total banking assets in 2009
36.0% of total banking assets in 2008
Foreign involvement in banking system
35.0% of total banking assets in
2009.
Government ownership of banking system
Data not available
Up to 100% insurance on deposits up
to in 2008
Existence of deposit insurance
Up to 100% insurance on deposits up
to in 2009
Sources: Bloomberg, Oireachtas 2008, World Bank Global Financial Development
Database, World Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey.
Five-bank concentration of banking system
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Key Design Decisions
1. Part of a Package: Ireland’s Department of Finance announced the capital
investments in a stepwise fashion in the months after issuing a blanket liability
guarantee for the country’s six largest banks. The legal authority for them,
though, came as part of a package of new authorities.
The Department of Finance’s statement that it intended to execute capital injections did not
include other measures, as was the case with later iterations of the program’s details (Dept.
of Finance 2008d; Dept. of Finance 2008a; Dept. of Finance 2009). However, lawmakers
granted the capitalization authority to the minister for finance as part of the Credit
Institutions (Financial Support) Act 2008, which also granted expanded authorities to
support bank liabilities; furthermore, the capital injections were only available to banks
receiving such liability support (Oireachtas 2008; Irish Times 2008). In April 2009, the
Department announced its intention to create the National Asset Management Agency, an
asset management firm that began purchasing assets from Irish banks in 2010 to improve
their balance sheet strength (Nye 2021).
2. Legal Authority: The Credit Institutions (Financial Support) Act 2008 granted the
minister for finance the authority to purchase shares in some credit institutions.
The Investment of the National Pensions Reserve Fund and Miscellaneous
Provisions Act 2009 authorized the minister to use the National Pensions
Reserve Fund (NPRF) for that purpose.
The Credit Institutions (Financial Support) Act, signed into law on October 2, 2008, allowed
the minister discretion to purchase shares in banks also receiving liability support under
the authority of the act (Oireachtas 2008, sec. 6(9)). Ireland’s parliament amended the
National Pensions Reserve Act to enable the minister to use the NPRF for the injections if
this was “necessary, in the public interest, to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy
of the State or . . . to prevent potential serious damage to the financial system in the State
and ensure the continued stability of that system” (Oireachtas 2009, sec. 8).
The capital injections were also subject to regulatory, shareholder, and European
Commission (EC) approvals (Dept. of Finance 2008a). The Department of Finance
announced on December 21 that it designed the recapitalization program with regard “to
the recent European Commission Recapitalisation Communication” (Dept. of Finance
2008a; EC 2008). This document, released on October 25, 2008, outlined the “broad
framework within which the State aid compatibility of recapitalization and guarantee
schemes, and cases of application of such schemes, could be rapidly assessed” by the EC (EC
2008, 1). The guidance on recapitalizations called for using nondiscriminatory criteria for
eligibility, limiting the term of the scheme and the amount of aid to the minimum
necessary, and implementing safeguards against abuses and competitive distortion. It also
required EC review of a restructuring plan for any institution that received capital (EC
2008, 5–6).

198

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 3 Iss. 3

3. Communication: Officials described the effort as a supplement to private
capitalization efforts. They also described the recipient institutions as being
solvent before the additional funding.
The Department of Finance regularly referred to its recapitalization efforts as intended to
“supplement” and “encourage” private capitalization efforts (Dept. of Finance 2008c; Dept.
of Finance 2008d; Dept. of Finance 2008a). On December 14, 2008, the Department noted
“the institutions continue to progress proposals for private investment” (Dept. of Finance
2008d). On November 30, 2008, the Department said capital injections would be for
purposes of ensuring banks “remain strong and stable institutions with capital levels well
above the normal regulatory minima” (Dept. of Finance 2008c). Similarly, on December 14,
the Department noted, “even fundamentally sound banks may require additional capital to
respond to widespread market perception that higher capital ratios are appropriate for the
sector internationally” (Dept. of Finance 2008d).
4. Administration: The minister for finance directed the investments and
management thereof, but the National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA)
acted as the custodian of the holdings.
The NTMA, as manager of the National Pensions Reserve Fund, held the securities funded
by its investments (NTMA 2010, 29–31). The NPRF, run by the NTMA, is an investment
fund funded by the Exchequer (see Key Design Decision No. 5 below) that invests with the
goal of “meeting as much as possible of the costs of social welfare and public service
pensions from 2025 onwards”. The NTMA reports directly to the minister for finance
(NTMA 2010, 6). The National Pensions Reserve Fund Commission, a board appointed by
the minister for finance and including the chief executive of the NTMA, controls the NPRF
and manages its investments “in accordance with its statutory investment policy,” which
“requires that the NPRF be invested so as to secure the optimal total financial return
provided the level of risk is acceptable to the [NPRF] Commission” (NTMA 2010, 30).
However, as per the Investment of the National Pensions Reserve Fund and Miscellaneous
Provisions Act 2009, the minister for finance held the authority to direct the management,
exercise, and disposal of the securities and any pursuant rights attached to the shares
resulting from the minister’s directed capital injections (Oireachtas 2009, sec. 19B). The
Oireachtas also established the Joint Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis in 2014
to investigate the government’s crisis management systems and policies, among other
aspects of Ireland’s banking crisis (Joint Committee 2016, 375); the committee, comprising
11 members of the legislature, released its final report in 2016 (Joint Committee 2016).
5. Size/Timing/Source of Injections: The Department of Finance drew €7 billion
from the National Pensions Reserve Fund to fund the investments in the two
banks.
On December 14, 2008, the Department signaled a willingness to inject up to €10 billion of
capital in Irish banks “through the National Pensions Reserve Fund or otherwise” (Dept. of
Finance 2008d). However, the size ceiling was not pursuant to a specific limit on available
funds or authority; one week later, the Department of Finance dropped this language,
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instead stating, “The Government has a substantial pool of additional capital available to
underwrite and otherwise support the issuance of core tier 1 capital” (Dept. of Finance
2008a).
Using the NPRF for this purpose required a statutory amendment, and the government
stated that “the National Pensions Reserve Fund Act, 2000 will be amended, as necessary”
(Dept. of Finance 2008d; NTMA 2010, 30; Oireachtas 2000).
The amendment to the NPRF Act became law on March 5, 2009, as part of the Investment of
the National Pensions Reserve Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act (Oireachtas 2009).
The statutory change allowed the minister for finance to direct the NPRF’s investments. It
also enabled the minister for finance to bring forward scheduled NPRF investments
(Oireachtas 2009, secs. 6, 8). Prior to the amendment, the minister was to contribute 1% of
the gross national product to the NPRF annually from the general treasury fund (Oireachtas
2000, sec. 18).
The amendment allowed for any investment in excess of 1% to “be taken to be in
satisfaction . . . of the amount required . . . to be paid into the Fund in any subsequent year”
(Oireachtas 2009, sec. 6). Thus, there was no legal cap on the amount of funds the minister
could inject this way; the funds were provided for out of the indefinite future stream of
public pension investment.
The EC granted its approvals of the capital injections for Bank of Ireland (BoI) on March 26,
2009, and for Allied Irish Banks (AIB) on May 12, 2009 (EC 2009a; EC 2009b). After
shareholder approvals, the injections followed on March 30 and May 13,4 respectively
(Irish Times 2009; NTMA 2010, 30; RTÉ 2009).
However, fiscal space ultimately proved limited, as the Irish government later lost
reasonable access to the bond market (Eichengreen 2014, 356–57). Indeed, rather than
fund the whole of both bank investments from pulling forward government funding of
pension investments, the National Pensions Reserve Fund did liquidate €4 billion (mainly
cash reserves and government bonds) of its existing assets to help fund the investment
(NTMA 2010, 30–31). The remaining €3 billion came from the Exchequer pulling forward
pension contributions for 2009 and 2010 (NTMA 2010, 30).
Policymakers adjusted their intended recapitalization amounts upward as the banking
system’s dire situation became clearer—and more tenuous (BIS 2020, 16–17). Although
not intended, this incremental result with respect to the scale of the injections, while
perhaps consistent with European Commission guidance, was to the detriment of the
recapitalization as it created public uncertainty toward the banks’ financial positions and
reduced confidence in officials’ management of the problem (BIS 2020, 16–17; EC 2008, 5–

4 The

National Treasury Management Agency said the minister directed the National Pensions Reserve Fund
to execute the share purchase on May 12, but this seems to be inaccurate. The injection was subject to a
shareholder vote, which didn’t occur until the following day (Irish Times 2009). The European Commission
also noted on May 12 that the injection would occur after the May 13 vote (EC 2009b, 10).
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6). Over the ensuing years, the largest six institutions (merged into four) ultimately
recapitalized with more than €80 billion ($103 billion), approximately 75% of which came
from public sources (BIS 2020, 18); see the Appendix for the breakdown between public
and private funds.
6. Eligible Institutions: The minister for finance could buy shares in any institution
that was also receiving support from the liability guarantee scheme.
Eligible institutions originally included Ireland’s six largest domestically controlled banks:
BoI, AIB, Anglo Irish Bank (Anglo), Irish Life and Permanent (IL&P), Irish Nationwide
Building Society (INBS), and the Educational Building Society (EBS) (Dept. of Finance
2008b). Competitive concerns later spurred the government to offer an expansion of the
liabilities guarantee to local banking subsidiaries of foreign institutions with a broad
presence in Ireland (NYT 2008). However, the newly eligible banks did not take up this
offer. Policymakers addressed the capital needs of the three most financially troubled of
the six firms—Anglo, BoI, and AIB—in early 2009 (Honohan 2010, 123; Tooze 2018, 185).
These three firms were facing the most severe risk of failure of the six banks; Anglo’s near
failure prompted AIB and BoI to coordinate with the government and encourage its original
intervention, the bank liability guarantee on September 30, 2008 (Honohan 2010, 123).
Later in 2008, as the banks continued to experience liquidity strains and were facing
increasingly large and uncertain losses, they began discussions with the government on
injecting capital; the resultant injections were the outcome of extended negotiations
between the two banks and the government on the terms and size of the capital injections
(Honohan 2012, 2; Joint Committee 2016, 292). Ultimately, all six firms received additional
government capital in 2010 and beyond, but distinct from the program described here (BIS
2020, 48).
7. Limits on Participation: There does not appear to have been any limit on
individual institutions’ participation.
There does not appear to have been any strict limit on individual institutions’ participation.
European Commission guidance, however, called for limiting the size of the injection to the
minimum amount required. While the Commission noted that eligibility should be limited
to “objective criteria, such as the need to ensure a sufficient level of capitalisation with
respect to the solvency requirements,” the Department of Finance did not specify a specific
capital ratio target for recipients (EC 2008, 5–6). Ireland’s banks’ capital ratios were above
their regulatory minima in 2008; the Department of Finance did reference market
perceptions of capital ratios, saying that the injections “will ensure that capital ratios in the
Irish banks will meet the expectations of international investors” (Dept. of Finance 2008c;
Dept. of Finance 2008a). BoI’s and AIB’s restructuring plans were later subject to an 8%
common equity Tier 1 capital ratio, and a 4% and 5.5% post-stress capital ratio,
respectively, per the Financial Regulator’s new stress tests (EC 2010, 13; EC 2014, 15).
(AIB’s restructuring plan was finalized several years later than BoI’s; see Key Design
Decision No. 11.) Furthermore, a commentator close to the program made clear to YPFS
that the offer of government capital was not open-ended; rather, the government engaged
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in capital injection negotiations on a case-by-case basis and attempted to fit the size of the
injection to the bank’s capital needs.
8. Capital Characteristics: AIB and BoI received core tier 1 capital from the NPRF in
the form of noncumulative, preferred shares with warrants.
AIB and BoI both received €3.5 billion in core tier 1 capital in return for noncumulative,
preferred (“preference”) shares. These shares with came with 25% of the firms’ voting
rights on issues of change of control and board appointments.
The shares also came with warrants giving the state the right to purchase 25% of the
common shares of each bank after five years. The strike prices for these warrants were in
each bank’s case less than €1. A bank could reduce the warrants’ rights by redeeming the
preferred shares. If a bank redeemed up to €1.5 billion of the preferred shares by the end
of 2009, the warrants’ rights were to fall to as low as 15% of the common shares, on a pro
rata basis (Dept. of Finance 2009). Additionally, the tranche of warrants that the bank
could extinguish (by repurchasing up to €1.5 billion of the preferred shares by the end of
2009) had a materially lower strike price than the rest of the warrants; this feature aimed
to encourage banks to expediently replace government capital with new private capital (EC
2009a, 7; EC 2009b, 7).
The state could not vote more than half of the votes associated with any shares it received
though exercise of the warrants. If the state transferred the shares to a nonstate third
party, however, full voting privileges became reinstated.
The preferred shares paid an annual dividend of 8%. If the bank could not pay the cash
dividend, the terms required the bank to issue the government common shares in its place
(Dept. of Finance 2009).
The Department of Finance originally proposed stricter terms for Anglo in a December 21,
2008 press release. Those terms included a 10% dividend rate on preferred shares with
75% of voting rights (Dept. of Finance 2008a). Instead, it decided the following month to
nationalize Anglo and put it under government management (Lenihan 2009). As the crisis
lingered, officials wound down Anglo and INBS. The government engaged in further rounds
of capital support for these and other banks, including via promissory notes and common
shares (BIS 2020, 14, 16). See also the Appendix.
9. Allocation of Losses: While debtholders were protected throughout the duration
of the original bank liabilities guarantee, shareholders experienced material
write-downs and dilution.
When it announced the capital injections for AIB and BoI, the Department of Finance stated,
“The State does not intend to take control of these banks. Following this recapitalisation,
the State will not hold ordinary shares in either bank”.
The warrants granted the state the potential for up to 25% control of each bank. This was
in addition to the specific voting privileges conferred upon the preferred shares (see Key
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Design Decision No. 8), but the warrants could not be exercised for five years (Dept. of
Finance 2009). When this recapitalization effort proved insufficient, however, later
capitalization actions took government control in BoI and AIB to 36% and 99.8%,
respectively (BIS 2020, 48–49).
While the original bank liabilities guarantee covered all debtholders, it was only available
for two years, ultimately expiring and exposing some legacy debt to losses (see Key Design
Decision No. 10).
10. Debt Restructuring: The government did not require the banks to undergo any
debt restructuring as part of the 2009 capital injections.
Policymakers lacked clear legal authority to discriminate among various classes of
creditors, inhibiting their ability to impose losses on certain debtholders outside of
insolvency proceedings (BIS 2020, 13). Moreover, given Irish authorities’ desire to avoid
bank failures, the government’s guarantee of bank liabilities implemented on September 30
included banks’ subordinated debt (BIS 2020, 13; Dept. of Finance 2008b). This suggests
debt restructuring was not a serious consideration as part of the recapitalization effort.
According to Baudino, Murphy, and Svoronos (2020), the authorities did consider debt
restructuring but came up against legal and market impediments (BIS 2020, 13).
In later years, going-concern banks engaged in voluntary (in cases where the bank was a
going-concern) agreements with creditors, wherein the banks would buy back debt at a
price below par, thus boosting their capital (BIS 2020, 17). The financial rescue package
ultimately negotiated with the International Monetary Fund and European Union, however,
called for the continued, full support of senior bank liabilities (Honohan 2012, 2).
11. Other Conditions: The recapitalized banks agreed to several nonpecuniary terms
tied to receiving the capital injections.
In striking a deal for capital from the government’s NPRF in early 2009, AIB and BoI each
agreed to the following terms with the Irish government (Dept. of Finance 2009):
•

Grant the finance minister the right to directly appoint 25% of the respective
banks’ boards of directors as long as any of the preferred shares were still
outstanding.

•

Decrease total senior executive pay by 33%, inclusive of not paying performance
bonuses for 2008 or 2009 nor granting salary increases for any of these
employees.

•

Reduce fees for nonexecutive directors by 25%.

•

Increase 2009 lending capacity to small and medium-sized enterprises by 10%
and to first-time homebuyers by 30%. If the latter capacity went unused, it was
to be reallocated to the former.

203

Ireland 2009 Recapitalization Program for Financial Institutions

Kelly

•

Establish a €100 million environmental and clean energy innovation fund;
contribute €15 million in new funding to venture capital funds; and participate
in other, smaller industry and public-private initiatives surrounding credit
availability.

•

Avoid initiating court proceedings for home repossession until homeowners
were 12 months in arrears, and generally make every effort to avoid
repossession.

•

Abide by prompt payment rules to make contractual payments within 30 days or
face an interest charge; add such language to future customer contracts.

•

Submit to the European Commission within six months a restructuring plan
consistent with long-term viability and minimizing State Aid and any pursuant
distortion (EC 2009a, 7–8; EC 2009b, 8).

•

Refrain from marketing the capital injection as a competitive advantage (EC
2009a, 10; EC 2009b, 10).

The banks also remained subject to additional capital and strategic constraints associated
with their receiving liability guarantees pursuant to the Credit Institutions (Financial
Support) Act. These included an indefinite ban on dividend payments to nongovernment
investors, a prohibition on share buybacks absent regulatory approval, a requirement to
consult with the government before making any asset-related disclosures, and the
government’s right to appoint two members to each bank’s board (EC 2009a, 8–9; EC
2009b, 9).
The EC approved BoI’s restructuring plan on July 15, 2010. The plan called for BoI to
dispose of several of its subsidiaries and wind down a number of loan books, reduce its
reliance on fragile wholesale funding, raise capital, and improve its risk management
processes (EC 2010, 9–15).
The EC approved AIB’s plan on May 7, 2014, after ongoing discussions and several updates
to its original submission in 2009 (EC 2014, 2). The restructuring plan acknowledged the
progress that AIB had already made in restructuring: several business divestments, a
reduction in leverage, replacement of senior bank officials, and other downsizing measures
(EC 2014, 10). The 2014 restructuring plan called for AIB to continue to downsize, give
greater emphasis to its domestic business, reduce reliance on European Central Bank
funding, and increase its retained earnings (EC 2014, 13–15).
12. Exit Strategy: Banks could buy out the government stake at a preset price if they
replaced it with new core tier 1 capital.
Banks could buy out the government shares at the purchase price, if purchased within five
years. If the buyback happened after five years, the banks had to pay a 25% premium. In
either case, the bank could do so only if it received approval from the Financial Regulator
and replaced the capital with new core tier 1 capital (Dept. of Finance 2008a).
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